Chairwoman Kelly, Congressman Gutierrez, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the important role it plays in the Department of the Treasury and the United States government’s efforts as a whole to understand, detect, and prevent financial crimes and terrorist financing. Although this is my first time as a witness before this Subcommittee, I have followed the committee’s leadership on issues relating to terrorist financing and money laundering and am very honored to appear before you today.


I became FinCEN’s fourth director on December 1, 2003. Before I came to FinCEN, I was working as the principal assistant to the General Counsel of the Treasury Department on issues relating to terrorist financing, which were issues that occupied a great deal of my time. Coming from the Department, I understood, to a large extent, the nature of FinCEN’s responsibilities and what it was doing to carry out the obligations imposed by these responsibilities. In these six months, I have done a great deal of listening and learning from inside and outside of FinCEN. I have met extensively with the law enforcement and intelligence communities that we serve and the financial industry that we help regulate. I have met with and listened to the staffs of interested committees in the Congress – including this committee. I have met with some of my counterparts in foreign governments and communicated with many more; and, of course, I have had a continuous dialogue and received tremendous support from those at Treasury – including Secretary Snow, Deputy Secretary Bodman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Zarate.


Now, six months later I believe I have a clear idea of what FinCEN’s mission means in real terms -- the challenges FinCEN is facing in carrying out its obligations; what needs to be done to meet those challenges and how FinCEN’s mission supports the Department of the Treasury’s efforts to safeguard the nation’s financial system. Let me begin with a discussion of our mission and its attendant responsibilities. I believe it is essential to have a clear understanding of FinCEN and its role in preventing financial crime to understand how its ability to fulfill its obligations will be enhanced under the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.


FinCEN is charged with helping to safeguard the financial system of the United States from being abused by criminals and terrorists. FinCEN works to accomplish its mission through: (1) administration of the Bank Secrecy Act – a regulatory regime that provides for the reporting of highly sensitive financial data that are critical to investigations of financial crime; (2) dissemination of the data reported under the Bank Secrecy Act to law enforcement and, under appropriate circumstances, the intelligence community; (3) analysis of information related to illicit finance – both strategic and tactical analysis; and, (4) education and outreach provided to law enforcement and the financial industry on issues relating to illicit finance. FinCEN has many attributes that are key to understanding the agency:


  • FinCEN is a regulatory agency. FinCEN has an obligation to administer the Bank Secrecy Act, the principal regulatory statute aimed at addressing the problems of money laundering and other forms of illicit finance, including terrorist financing. It is responsible for shaping and implementing this regulatory regime and, in concert with the functional bank regulators and the Internal Revenue Service, for ensuring compliance with the regime. The agency is also charged with protecting the integrity and confidentiality of the information collected under the Bank Secrecy Act.


  • FinCEN is a financial intelligence agency. While not a member of the intelligence community, FinCEN is responsible for ensuring the efficient and timely collection, maintenance, analyses and dissemination of financial information critical to investigations of illicit finance.


  • FinCEN is a law enforcement support agency. While FinCEN has no criminal investigative or arrest authority, much of our effort supports the investigation and successful prosecution of financial crime.


  • FinCEN is a network. We are not directed to support one agency or a select group of agencies. We make our information, products and services available to all agencies that have a role in investigating illicit finance. In fact, we network these agencies. Our technology tells us when different agencies are searching the same data and we put those agencies together – avoiding investigative overlap and permitting the agencies to leverage resources and information.


FinCEN fits perfectly in the Department of the Treasury, possibly even more so after the Homeland Security reorganization than before that reorganization. The creation of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence within Treasury only enhances that fit. FinCEN will be able to help “operationalize” Treasury’s policy priorities on these important issues and our operational analytic work will complement the analysis that will eventually be done in the newly created Office of Financial Intelligence. I believe this coordinated effort will lead to a greater emphasis and understanding of money laundering, terrorist financing and other forms of illicit finance not only at Treasury, but

within the United States, and that will make us all safer. FinCEN will also benefit from the Department-wide, policy-coordinating role this office will provide.


  1. Background


    By virtue of a delegation order from the Secretary of the Treasury and a statute passed as part of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN is charged with the responsibility of administering the regulatory regime of the Bank Secrecy Act. Among other things, we issue regulations and accompanying interpretive guidance; collect, analyze and maintain the reports and information filed by financial institutions under the Bank Secrecy Act; make those reports and information available to law enforcement and regulators; and ensure financial institution compliance with the regulations through enforcement actions aimed at applying the regulations in consistent manner across the financial services industry. FinCEN also plays an important role in analyzing the Bank Secrecy Act information collected to support law enforcement, identifying strategic money laundering and terrorist financing trends and patterns, and identifying Bank Secrecy Act compliance issues.


    FinCEN was created as an office within Treasury in 1990. Its original mission was focused on analysis – both tactical and strategic – of data collected under the Bank Secrecy Act along with other financial data. Treasury’s Office of Financial Enforcement (OFE) was originally responsible for the administration of the Bank Secrecy Act regulatory regime. In 1994, Treasury merged OFE into FinCEN and delegated the responsibility to administer the regulatory regime to FinCEN. Treasury sought to link the analytical functions with the administration of the regulatory regime that dictated the information that financial institutions were required to record and report. Adding responsibilities for administering the regulatory regime strengthened and expanded FinCEN’s analytical and intelligence abilities.


    While FinCEN is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act regulatory regime, FinCEN does not itself examine financial institutions for compliance. Instead, FinCEN taps the resources and expertise of other Federal agencies and self- regulatory organizations by relying on these agencies to conduct compliance exams, through delegations of authority that largely predated FinCEN. Examination responsibility has been delegated to other federal regulators as follows:


    • Depository Institutions – The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration have been delegated authority to examine the depository institutions they regulate for Bank Secrecy Act compliance.


    • Securities Broker-Dealers, Mutual Funds, and Futures Commission Merchants/Introducing Brokers – FinCEN has delegated examination authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and relies on their self-regulatory agencies

      (such as the NASD, the NYSE, and the NFA) to examine these entities for compliance.


    • Other Financial Institutions – The Internal Revenue Service (Small Business/Self-Employed Division) has been delegated responsibility for examining all other financial institutions subject to Bank Secrecy Act regulation for compliance, including, for example, depository institutions with no federal regulator, casinos, and Money Services Businesses (MSBs).


      Even in the absence of examiners, FinCEN has an important role in supporting the examination regime created through our delegations. FinCEN’s role involves providing prompt Bank Secrecy Act interpretive guidance to regulators, policy makers and the financial services industry, and ensuring the consistent application of the Bank Secrecy Act regulations across industry lines, most notably through the rule-making process and subsequent guidance. We promote Bank Secrecy Act compliance by all financial institutions through training, education and outreach. We support the examination functions performed by the other agencies by providing them access to information filed by financial institutions in suspicious activity reports, currency transaction reports, and other Bank Secrecy Act reports. We also facilitate cooperation and the sharing of information among the various financial institution regulators to enhance the effectiveness of Bank Secrecy Act examination and, ultimately, industry compliance.


      FinCEN has retained the authority to pursue civil enforcement actions against financial institutions for non-compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and the implementing regulations. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, FinCEN is empowered to assess civil monetary penalties against, or require corrective action by, a financial institution committing negligent or willful violations.


      Generally, FinCEN identifies potential enforcement cases through (1) referrals from the agencies examining for Bank Secrecy Act compliance; (2) self-disclosures by financial institutions; and, (3) FinCEN’s own inquiry to the extent it becomes aware of possible violations. Referrals from the examining agencies are regularly made to FinCEN. It should be noted that under Title 12, the banking regulators have authority to enforce certain regulations that fall under that statute as well as under the Bank Secrecy Act, such as the requirement that depository institutions have anti-money laundering programs. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service has authority to enforce certain Bank Secrecy Act requirements including the IRS/FinCEN Form 8300 reporting for non- financial trades and businesses, and the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts by individual and entities.


  2. FinCEN’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy


    The single, most important operational priority for FinCEN is counter-terrorism support to law enforcement and the intelligence community. To emphasize the importance of this work we have improved and are now implementing a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that draws from our analytic support to law enforcement, our

    regulatory tools and expertise, and our international networking capabilities. We believe the implementation of this strategy will strengthen our focus and ensure that FinCEN is more active and aggressive rather than reactive on issues relating to terrorism. The strategy has five basic components.


    1. Analysis of Terrorist Financing Suspicious Activity Reports


      FinCEN analyzes suspicious activity reports for both tactical and strategic value. At the tactical level, we are implementing a program in which every report that indicates a connection to terrorism is immediately reviewed and validated and then analyzed with other available information. This information will be packaged and referred to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), FBI-TFOS, and other relevant law enforcement. Moreover, this information will be stored in a manner that facilitates its access and availability for analysis.


      At the strategic level, we are also devoting analysts to studying Bank Secrecy Act data and all other available information to gain an increased understanding of methodologies, typologies, geographic patterns of activity and systemic vulnerabilities relating to terrorist financing. These analysts will focus on regional and systemic “hot spots” for terrorist financing, studying and analyzing all sources of information. Such focus, which produced the study mandated by the Congress on Informal Value Transfer Systems, can significantly add to the knowledge base of law enforcement. For example, we have begun a process to comprehensively study illicit trade in diamonds and other precious stones and metals and the links to terrorist finance. Although this initiative is currently underway, in order to fully implement it, we will need to upgrade analysts’ security clearances and obtain equipment appropriate for the handling of national security information.


    2. USA PATRIOT Act Sections 311 and 314 Implementation


      Some of the new tools afforded us through the USA PATRIOT Act are proving to be invaluable in the war against terrorist financing, particularly Section 314 of the Act.

      FinCEN also has initiated a program to provide the analytic, regulatory and legal resources needed to support effective implementation of Section 311 by the Treasury Department. While this program captures targets involved in money laundering and other illicit finance, I have directed my staff to give priority to the pro-active targeting of those financial institutions and jurisdictions that are involved, wittingly or unwittingly, in the financing of terror. This prophylactic measure goes to the very heart of FinCEN’s mission – to safeguard the financial system of the United States from money launderers and the financiers of terror.


      Building on a successful pilot program that we began with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs on a 314(a) money-laundering request, FinCEN is now dedicating several analysts to apply this program to all 314(a) terrorism requests. Specifically, the analysts will run all 314(a) terrorism-related requests against Bank Secrecy Act data concurrent with these requests being sent to financial institutions.

      Based on this initial data review, the law enforcement requester will then be able to request a more in-depth analysis if desired. I will provide additional details on this valuable tool later in my testimony.


    3. International Cooperation and Information Sharing


      FinCEN will increase the exchange of terrorist financing investigative and analytical information with other foreign financial intelligence units around the world. We are implementing a program where FinCEN will automatically request information from relevant financial-intelligence-unit counterparts as part of any terrorism-related analysis project. As part of this program, we are also upgrading our response to incoming requests for information from financial intelligence units by providing appropriate information and analysis from all sources of information.


    4. Terrorism Regulatory Outreach


      We will continue our work in improving our ability to provide information to the regulated community to better identify potential terrorist financing activity. One area of particular focus will be money services businesses. Money services businesses continue to require more attention and resources, and FinCEN will undertake an initiative to educate segments of the industry most vulnerable to terrorist abuse. These segments include small businesses that typically offer money remittance services, check cashing, money orders, stored value products and other informal value transfer systems. As we learned from the attacks of September 11th, funds used to finance terrorist operations can be and have been moved in small amounts using, for example, wire transfer, traveler’s

      check and automated teller machine services. I have directed FinCEN’s Office of Regulatory Programs and the Office of Strategic Analysis to enhance our outreach program to include: training on how terrorists have used and continue to use money services businesses; the reason for and importance of the registration requirement for money services businesses; and the importance of complying with the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, especially suspicious activity reporting. We are planning to streamline suspicious activity reporting for small money services businesses with a simplified form.


    5. Analytic Skill Development


    As a general matter, I have directed that FinCEN make training of personnel the highest human resource management priority. The top priority of this new program will be analytic skill development relating to terrorist financing. We plan to begin by seeking reciprocal opportunities for terrorist finance analytic skill development within law enforcement, the Egmont Group, the intelligence community and the financial industry. This initiative is intended to build a foundation for continuous improvement of our analytic assets through: cross training and diversification; production of joint terrorist- financing threat assessments and other reports; and, understanding intelligence processes and the international context of terrorist financing, as well as the financial industry perspective. In addition, we will need to support training focused on financial forensics,

    language skills, and geographically targeted studies that focus on culture, infrastructure and other unique aspects of a particular region.


    I believe the full implementation of this strategy will materially assist the Department of the Treasury and the United States in addressing the financing of terror. Approaching this problem in a systemic way with dedicated resources is, in our view, the best way to make this strategy a success.


  3. FinCEN’s Near Term Challenges


    As I mentioned before, FinCEN is facing a number of significant challenges.

    Because each of these challenges affects FinCEN’s effectiveness in contributing to the important issues addressed at this hearing today, I would like to raise these challenges with the committee.


    1. Security and Dissemination of Bank Secrecy Act Information


      As the administrator of the Bank Secrecy Act, there is no duty I view as critical as the effective collection, management and dissemination of the highly sensitive and confidential information collected under that Act. If FinCEN does nothing else, it must ensure that data are properly collected, are secure and are appropriately and efficiently disseminated. This is FinCEN’s core responsibility.


      Regarding security of information, recent press reports have reported the unauthorized disclosure of suspicious activity reports. Such disclosures simply cannot be tolerated, as they undermine the entire reporting program. Those who report this information will become increasingly reticent to file what amounts to a confidential tip to law enforcement if they believe their report will end up on the front page of the Washington Post or the Wall Street Journal. The release of this information by those to whom it was entrusted threatens everything that we all have worked so hard to build. I know I do not have to convince this Subcommittee of the importance of this reporting system. It has yielded, and will continue to yield, information that is critical to the investigation of money laundering and illicit finance. I also wish to assure this Subcommittee and the American people that FinCEN is acutely aware of the privacy interests implicated in this reporting and the need to guard against inappropriate disclosure of such information. Unauthorized disclosure of information will be immediately referred to law enforcement for investigation and dealt with as severely as the law permits. Our international partners who inappropriately disclose information we have entrusted to them will jeopardize our agreements to share information with them.


      However, this issue goes deeper than unauthorized disclosures. In my view, FinCEN must change the way it houses and provides access to information collected under the Bank Secrecy Act. Currently, our data are accessed by most of our customers through an outmoded data retrieval system. This system does not have the robust data mining capabilities or analytical tools we employ at FinCEN. This has led many of our customers to ask for wholesale copies of the data, or direct access to the data in a way

      that will not permit us to perform our responsibilities relating to the administration and management of the data. This is not simply a question of employing better technology. It is a matter of sound governance. FinCEN cannot permit this inability to control the data we are charged with managing to continue. Accordingly, we must create a system

      that provides robust data mining and analytical tools to our customers in law enforcement and that preserves our ability to: (1) effectively administer and secure the information;

      (2) network those persons who are querying the data to prevent overlapping investigations and encourage efficient use of law enforcement resources; and, (3) develop and provide adequate feedback to the financial industries we regulate, which will ensure better reporting. That system is called “BSA Direct.”


      When fully implemented, BSA Direct will make available robust, state-of-the-art, data mining capabilities and other analytic tools directly to law enforcement. We plan to provide all access to these data through BSA Direct, working with our law enforcement customers to ensure their systems extract the maximum value from the Bank Secrecy Act reporting. We will be exploring ways to enable these agencies to integrate the Bank Secrecy Act reporting with their other systems while maintaining, and even improving our ability to audit and network the use of the data and obtain feedback concerning their value. This system will provide us the capability to discharge our responsibilities relating to the administration of these sensitive data: security and access control, networking, and feedback. This system will also significantly enhance our coordination and information sharing abilities, as well as our ability to safeguard the privacy of the information. We have already started work on this system. Based on preliminary studies, we estimate that this system will cost approximately $6 million to build. We are in the process of developing BSA Direct with resources in the FY2005 request and the forfeiture fund.


    2. Enhancing FinCEN’s Analytical Capabilities


      Another challenge FinCEN is facing relates to its analytic capabilities. In my view, FinCEN must move away from its current emphasis on data checks and data retrieval, and move its analytic resources toward more robust and sophisticated analysis. FinCEN had moved to data checks and data retrieval in response to criticisms about turn around times on often simple requests for information. Now, as our systems improve, our customers will be able to retrieve data themselves, which will give FinCEN more time and resources for analysis.